*This critical analysis was carried out today following observations based on the perceived hands dealt and played (GC)
Response:
The paper’s comparison of muraqaba (from Sufi Islam) and maharaba (from Indic spiritual traditions) rests on the presumption that these terms are semantically and conceptually equivalent, a view that not only overlooks the deep-seated political and historical contexts of these practices but also commits serious philosophical errors. Through this lens, the paper fails to acknowledge the role of language and culture as tools of power and control throughout history.
The paper’s attempt to disconnect religion and politics from language is not just naive—it is dangerous, as it perpetuates a historical amnesia that disregards how language has been instrumental in territorialisinv knowledge, reinforcing power structures, and shaping the global political landscape. This critical examination will delve into these issues, drawing from scholarly references to underscore the fallacies and contradictions in the paper.
1. Language as a Tool of Political Control and Territorialisation
Language is never neutral—it is an essential instrument of cognitive and territorial control. The paper’s failure to engage with the historical and political implications of the terms muraqaba and maharaba demonstrates a lack of understanding of the pivotal role that language has played in constructing both physical and cognitive territories. Historically, the imposition of language has been intertwined with the creation and maintenance of political boundaries and social hierarchies.
For instance, the Arabic term muraqaba derives from the root r-q-b, meaning vigilance or surveillance. In the Islamic tradition, especially within the context of Sufism, this concept embodies the practitioner’s awareness of divine surveillance, which not only affirms a theocentric worldview but also reflects the structure of power in Islamic societies. The concept of being “under constant observation” is politically loaded: it suggests a system of internal governance where the individual must be constantly aware of God’s gaze, reinforcing the authority of religious leaders and the state.
As Nasr (1999) argues in The Garden of Truth: The Vision and Promise of Sufism, Sufi practices are intricately tied to the spiritual and political structures of Islamic civilisation. Muraqaba can be seen as a practice that aligns the individual’s behavior with the state-sanctioned religious and moral codes, essentially functioning as a disciplinary mechanism for both the soul and society.
In contrast, the term maharaba, from Sanskrit, originates from mahā (great) and rābha (conflict, engagement). While the paper attempts to link maharaba to concepts of inner reflection and transcendence, it overlooks the social and political significance of these practices within Hinduism and Buddhism.
These traditions emerged in a context where the personal quest for liberation (moksha) was often framed against political realities, such as the rise of monarchical and caste systems in ancient India. In The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali, Patanjali articulates how the mind, as a tool of both liberation and control, reflects the struggles of the individual within a larger societal framework (Bryant, 2009). The paper’s failure to acknowledge how self-realisation within Indic traditions is frequently inextricable from societal and political forces reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the roles these practices played in shaping and reinforcing social order.
2. The Fallacies of Oversimplification and False Equivalence
The author’s attempt to present muraqaba and maharaba as equivalent practices of observation and mindfulness commits an egregious over-simplification. To equate these terms is to erase centuries of philosophical divergence between monotheistic and polytheistic/non-theistic worldviews. The comparison ignores the vast chasm that separates the theocentric nature of Islamic spirituality from the polytheistic and non-theistic cosmologies of Hinduism and Buddhism. Foucault’s work on disciplinary societies (1975) underscores that systems of knowledge and belief are fundamentally linked to the power structures that support them.
Muraqaba, as a practice grounded in divine surveillance, reflects a power structure where the individual’s behaviour is continuously monitored by an external, omniscient deity. This reflects the way in which political power is reinforced through religious observance and surveillance—a theme prevalent in both medieval Islamic empires and contemporary Islamic regimes.
On the other hand, maharaba in Hinduism and Buddhism is fundamentally concerned with self-realisation and the overcoming of internal conflict. While it may share some superficial similarities with mindfulness or meditative practices in muraqaba, these practices are internally focused on the individual’s relationship with the cosmos, not an external divine observer. The failure to distinguish these two vastly different ontologies leads to a false equivalence fallacy, reducing complex, culturally embedded practices into an oversimplified notion of “mindfulness.”
Moreover, the paper’s assertion that both concepts are merely about mindfulness and observation overlooks the historical function of these practices as tools for maintaining social order and territorial power. By reducing both terms to abstract philosophical ideas, the paper ignores their roles in governing behaviour within specific political and religious systems.
As Gramsci (1971) notes in Selections from the Prison Notebooks, cultural hegemony is maintained not just through force but through the internalisation of ideological practices—and practices like muraqaba and maharaba were central to the cognitive control exerted by the ruling classes in both the Islamic and Indic worlds.
3. Causal Inference Fallacy and Historical Amnesia
The paper’s reliance on causal inference—suggesting that muraqaba and maharaba simply represent universal human experiences of observation and reflection—reveals a critical misunderstanding of the historical contexts that shape these practices. To suggest that these two practices reflect similar human experiences is to fall into a causal inference fallacy, ignoring the deep historical, cultural, and political factors that have shaped these terms.
As Edward Said (1978) argues in Orientalism, the process of Western intellectual engagement with non-Western traditions is fraught with misrepresentation and simplification. By asserting that muraqaba and maharaba are simply universal expressions of mindfulness, the paper overlooks the colonial history that sought to erase and flatten complex non-Western philosophies into easily digestible concepts for Western audiences. The paper’s failure to engage with this historical context of power reflects a form of intellectual colonialism, where non-Western practices are reduced to mere abstractions, disconnected from their historical and political origins.
4. Language and Power: The Role of Translation in Shaping the Future
The paper’s failure to acknowledge the political role of translation further undermines its analysis. As Walter Benjamin (1923) argued in The Task of the Translator, translation is not a neutral act; it is imbued with power and involves the domination of one linguistic and cultural system over another. In this paper, by treating muraqaba and maharaba as interchangeable concepts of mindfulness, the author participates in a process of intellectual colonisation, where the rich, politically laden practices of both traditions are flattened into a single, homogenous category.
The paper’s analysis is particularly problematic in the context of the globalised world where language continues to shape our understanding of power and territory. The translation of terms like muraqaba and maharaba can contribute to a larger political agenda, one that seeks to erase the complex cultural and historical contexts in which these terms developed. The failure to engage with these nuances will have real-world implications in how we continue to view non-Western traditions in an era of cultural hegemony and global power structures. As Said and Foucault both suggest, power is exercised not only through force but through the internalisation of knowledge. The paper’s reduction of these practices to universal spiritual concepts represents a dangerous erasure of the complex histories that continue to shape the world’s geopolitics today.
Conclusion
The paper’s superficial analysis of muraqaba and maharaba as equivalent practices of observation and mindfulness is politically, philosophically, and historically flawed. By reducing these complex terms to abstract ideas divorced from their religious and political roots, the paper contributes to a broader cultural amnesia that erases the role of language and religion in shaping power dynamics and territorial boundaries. Language, as a tool of political control, cannot be separated from its historical context, and any attempt to do so risks perpetuating a false equivalence that overlooks the real-world consequences of such simplifications. The historical context in which these terms developed has and will continue to shape worldviews and power relations for the foreseeable future. As we navigate a globalized world, it is critical to critically examine the role of language, translation, and religion in shaping our understanding of power and territory.
References
1. Said, Edward. Orientalism. Pantheon Books, 1978.
2. Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Pantheon Books, 1975.
3. Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. International Publishers, 1971.
4. Benjamin, Walter. The Task of the Translator. 1923.
5. Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. The Garden of Truth: The Vision and Promise of Sufism, Islam’s Mystical Tradition. HarperOne, 2007.
6. Bryant, Edwin F. The Yoga Sutras of Patanjali. North Point Press, 2009.
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